A Shakeup for the Duty of Confidentiality: The Competing
Priorities of a California Government Attorney
I. Introduction
In the early hours of January 17, 1994, a 6.7 magnitude
earthquake struck the Los Angeles area, killing seventy-two
people and injuring 1,500.1

Ninety-two percent of the structural

damage affected apartment buildings.2

The Northridge quake was

the most expensive disaster California had endured, causing $27
billion of building damage.3

In its aftermath, victims filed

more than 600,000 insurance claims.4

After having paid for

earthquake insurance year after year, many of these
policyholders were severely shortchanged when insurance
companies mishandled their cases and denied them coverage.5

1

Roberta Ann Johnson, Whistleblowing: When it Works and Why 40

(2003).
2

Id.

3

Lorena Iñiguez, The Quackenbush Years, L.A. Times, June 29,

2000, at A24.
4

Johnson, supra note 1, at 41.

5

Cindy Ossias, Whistleblower’s Tale, The Sacramento Bee, July 23,

2003, at I1.
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Consistent with its mission of “protect[ing] the consumers'
insurance interests,”6 the California Department of Insurance
(“CDI”) investigated how several insurance companies adjudicated
these claims and concluded that the companies had not complied
with insurance regulations.7

However, instead of fining the

companies and forcing them to pay restitution to the wronged
earthquake victims, the Insurance Commissioner, Charles
Quackenbush, settled with the companies by allowing them to make
nominal, tax-exempt “donations” to non-profit organizations.8
Then a CDI employee named Cindy Ossias blew the whistle,
exposing the truth about Quackenbush’s donation scheme.9

When

the California Assembly Insurance Committee asked Ossias about
the dubious settlements, she handed over internal CDI

6

About Us: An Introduction to CDI Operations,

http://www.insurance.ca.gov/0500-about-us/0100-cdi-introduction/
(last visited January 3, 2008).
7

Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility and Discipline, State Bar of

Cal., Report and Recommendation on AB 363 4 (2001), available at
http://calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/3cp0107c.pdf [hereinafter
COPRAC Report].
8
9

Ossias, supra note 5.
Id.
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documents.10

Partially as a result of her actions, testimony

before lawmakers revealed that the Insurance Commissioner had
failed to sufficiently discipline the insurance companies and,
worse yet, that he had used the funds for personal gain.11
Quackenbush eventually resigned.12
If the whistleblower had been a CDI economist, secretary,
or case worker, she would have quietly returned to work because
California’s whistleblower statutes protect employees from
retaliation.13

However, because Ossias was a CDI attorney, she

was far from off the hook.

The State Bar began to investigate

whether she should be disciplined for violating the duty of
confidentiality by revealing the documents to the Legislature.14
By favoring her duty to serve the public over whatever duty of

10

Id.

11

Iñiguez, supra note 3.

12

Virginia Ellis, State Insurance Dept. Reinstates Whistle-

blower, L.A. Times, Aug. 13, 2000, at A33 [hereinafter Ellis,
Insurance Dept. Reinstates Whistle-blower].
13

See Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 8547.8, 53298 (West 2007).

14

Richard A. Zitrin & Carol M. Langford, Legal Ethics in the

Practice of Law 550 (2d ed. 2001).
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confidentiality she may have owed to her “client,”15 Ossias
almost lost her ability to practice law.16
Government attorneys17 in California are caught between
competing policies.

On one hand, as government employees, they

are encouraged by the whistleblower protection statutes to
report misconduct in their departments.18

On the other, as

attorneys, they have sworn to maintain their clients’
confidentiality.19

This tension forces a government attorney who

has witnessed wrongdoing to choose between her desire to serve
the public and her ethical obligations as a lawyer.

15

See infra, Section IV(C).

The question of to whom a government

attorney owes the duty of confidentiality is far from clear in
California.

Depending on how one defines the government

“client,” it is very possible that Ossias did not violate her
duty of confidentiality.
16

Telephone Interview with Cindy Ossias, Senior Staff Counsel,

Cal. Dep’t of Ins. (September 24, 2007).
17

The term “government attorney” may include both attorneys who

work full-time as public servants and private counsel retained
by the government.
18
19

COPRAC REPORT, supra note 7 at 11 n.30.

See Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 8547.8, 53298 (West 2007).
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6068(e) (West 2007).
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After the Ossias affair, both the California Legislature
and the State Bar recognized the need to clarify when and how a
potential government attorney could safely blow the whistle
without risking her ability to practice law; however, after
several attempts, no new rules or laws have been passed.20

The

way in which Ossias’ case was handled was particular to her
situation; the State Bar prosecutor made it clear that his
decision to drop Ossias’ case was not precedential.21

As a

result, a government attorney contemplating whether to blow the
whistle in the future would face the same uncertainty as Ossias
but might instead decline to disclose wrongdoing to the
detriment of the public interest.

Who knows how many other

government attorneys have chosen to remain silent to the
detriment of the public good?
Section II will discuss the factual background of the
Ossias case.

Section III will explore the current legal

framework governing whistleblower protections and the duty of
confidentiality.

Section IV will consider how this framework

fails to meet the ethical concerns of government attorneys.

20

See infra, Section II(B).

21

Letter from Donald R. Steedman to Richard Alan Zitrin (Oct. 11,

2000), in Zitrin & Langford, supra note , at 551 [hereinafter
Steedman Letter].
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Section V will propose solutions that reconcile these problems
without compromising the traditional division of labor between
the Legislature and the judiciary.
II. Factual Background
A.

The Ground Shakes at the Department of Insurance
After the Northridge earthquake, the California Department

of Insurance (“CDI”) investigated how several insurance
companies adjudicated claims, concluding that the claim
practices were not in compliance with insurance regulations.22
CDI attorneys and examiners compiled grievances against the
insurance companies into confidential internal reports called
market conduct examinations.23
CDI attorney Cindy Ossias had participated in preparing the
market conduct examinations.24

She and other staff members found

that the insurance companies had mistreated policyholders by
conducting cursory damage inspections, making insufficient
settlement offers to pay for repairs, unreasonably delaying
damage discovery and payments, and then denying supplemental
claims based on an alleged expiration of the statute of

22

COPRAC Report, supra note 7.

23

Telephone Interview with Cindy Ossias, supra note 16.

24

Id.
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limitations.25

As a result, the market conduct examinations

recommended that the companies pay millions of dollars in
fines.26
Instead of forcing the companies to make restitution for
their behavior, Insurance Commissioner Charles Quackenbush
settled with the insurance companies.27

Quackenbush agreed not

to impose fines or finalize the market condition examinations if
the insurers would make donations to organizations dedicated to
earthquake education.28

These donations totaled $12 million and

were tax-deductible.29

25

Cindy Ossias, Whistleblower’s Tale, The Sacramento Bee, July

23, 2003, at I1.
26

Iñiguez, supra note 3.

Ossias testified before the Assembly

Insurance Committee that she had expected fines to range from
$20-40 million.
27

COPRAC Report, supra note 7, at 4.

Virginia Ellis & Carl Ingram, Whistleblower Emerges in

Quackenbush Probe, L.A. Times, June 23, 2000, at A21.
28

Id.

29

Iñiguez, supra note 3.

Quackenbush’s California Research and

Assistance Fund received 12.8 million in tax exempt “voluntary
contributions” from insurance companies.

Id.

Firemen’s Fund

paid $550,000.00 to a special fund to avoid further
investigation, Allstate paid $2 million to the California
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When Ossias and her colleagues noticed the large
discrepancy between the penalties they had recommended and the
tax-deductible donations represented in the settlement
agreements, they were “appalled.”30

Both the Los Angeles Times

and the California Legislature noticed this irregularity and
began investigating Quackenbush’s actions.31

In January, 2000,

when a consultant to the California Assembly Insurance Committee
Chairman asked Ossias whether she knew anything about the
settlements, she “put him off at first, grappled with [her]
conscience and then offered him the [market conduct examination]
reports.”32

Once Ossias turned over the reports to the

Legislature, the Senate judiciary subcommittee revealed them to
the public by posting them on the Internet.33

During a

Research and Assistance Fund, and 20th Century Insurance and
state Farm also donated to special foundations.
30

Id.

Ossias, supra note 5; see also Zitrin & Langford, supra note

14.
31

Id.

32

Ossias, supra note 5.

The Legislature began to focus on

Quackenbush as a result of a Los Angeles Times investigation
into the foundations.
33

Zitrin & Langford, supra note 14.

Ellis & Ingram, supra note 27.
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department-wide investigation that Quackenbush initiated,34
Ossias admitted during an “interview/interrogation” that she was
the whistleblower.35

The next day, the department Chief Counsel

ordered her to “vacate the premises immediately” and take
administrative leave.36
Once the Assembly Insurance Committee and the California
Attorney General began to investigate the matter, information
about the foundations’ involvement with Quackenbush’s political
and personal interests began to surface.37

The straw that broke

the camel’s back was testimony that the “commissioner personally
ordered his staff to collect $4 million in settlements with
title insurance companies for TV commercials featuring

34

Ellis, Insurance Dept. Reinstates Whistle-blower, supra note

12.
35

Ossias, supra note 5.

36

Id.

37

Iñiguez, supra note 3.

Instead of addressing earthquake-

related issues, the foundations sponsored a poll about
Commissioner Quackenbush’s political reputation and funded a
football training program that two of Quackenbush’s children
attended.

Id.
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Quackenbush.”38

Two days later, Quackenbush announced his

resignation.39
Ossias was eventually reinstated by Quackenbush’s successor
in August, 200040 and continues to work there today.41 Ossias was
not fired as a result of her actions because California
whistleblower laws protect government employees from
retaliation.42

However, Ossias’ status as an attorney was

threatened when the State Bar’s Office of Trial Counsel began
investigating whether her disclosure of confidential material43
merited disciplinary measures.44

Eventually, the State Bar

discontinued the investigation without determining whether

38

Id.

Ossias also testified that “she and other insurance

department lawyers had been ordered to shred documents
containing their recommendations for fines against the
companies.”

Ellis, Insurance Dept. Reinstates Whistle-blower,

supra note 12.
39

Id.

40

Id.

41

See Telephone Interview with Cindy Ossias, supra note 16.

42

See Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 8547.8, 53298 (West 2007).

43

The duty of confidentiality is codified in Cal. Bus. & Prof.

Code § 6068(e) (West 2007).
44

See Zitrin & Langford, supra note 14.
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Ossias had acted ethically.45

In a letter to Ossias’ attorney,46

the Bar prosecutor never identified whom was Ossias’ client and
whether she had breached the duty of confidentiality.47
Ossias was forced to choose between her desire as a public
employee to report government wrongdoing and her binding ethical
duty as an attorney to maintain client confidentiality.

Because

attorney conduct is governed both by statute48 and Rules of
Professional Conduct promulgated by the California Supreme Court
and California State Bar,49 both the Legislature and Bar
considered ways clarify the relationship of government
transparency policy and the duty of confidentiality.50
B.

The Legislature and State Bar Try to Pick Up the Pieces
Soon after the Ossias case, Assemblyman Darrel Steinberg

(D-Sacramento) proposed Assembly Bill (“A.B.”) 363, which would
create an exception to the duty of confidentiality enumerated in

45

Id.

46

Steedman Letter, supra note 21.

47

Zitrin & Langford, supra note 14.

Instead, the State Bar

prosecutors “exonerated Ossias on whistleblowing and public
policy grounds.”

Id.; see infra, Section IV(2).

48

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6000-6238 (West 2007).

49

Cal. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R 1-100(A) (2007).

50

See COPRAC Report, supra note 7, at 2.
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section 6068(e) of the California Business and Professions
Code.51

The exception was drafted to protect government lawyers

in California from the threat of losing their bar licenses when
they revealed confidential information to expose wrongdoing.52
While the Assembly was considering A.B. 363, Assemblyman
Steinberg requested that the Attorney General’s office comment
on whether “’whistleblower’ statutory protections applicable to
employees of the state and local public entities supersede the
statutes and rules governing the attorney-client privilege[.]”53

51

Virginia Ellis, Bill Proposes Protections for State Lawyers,

L.A. Times, Feb 22, 2001 at 3 [hereinafter Ellis, Bill Proposes
Protections]; see Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6068(e) (West 2000).
52

Ellis, Bill Proposes Protections, supra note 51.

53

84 Op. Cal. Att’y Gen. 71, 74 (2001) [hereinafter Attorney

General].

Although both the Steinberg query and the Attorney

General’s opinion seem to use the terms “attorney-client
privilege” and “duty of confidentiality” interchangeably, the
net result of the Attorney General’s conclusion is that the
whistleblower laws do not automatically override statutes that
deal with attorney conduct.

See Charles S. Doskow, The

Government Attorney and the Right to Blow the Whistle: The Cindy
Ossias Case and Its Aftermath (A Two-Year Journey to Nowhere),
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The opinion concluded that the Legislature did not intend the
whistleblower statutes to supersede the ethics provisions
governing attorney-client privilege.54
The Assembly passed A.B. 363 and the Senate Judiciary
Committee took it under submission.55

Soon, the State Bar became

interested in the possibility of amending the Rules of
Professional Conduct instead of the Business and Professions
Code.56

On July 9, 2001, the Senate suspended its hearings and

permitted the State Bar to conduct its own study of how A.B. 363
might impact government lawyers.57
The State Bar’s Committee on Professional Responsibility
and Discipline of (“COPRAC”) determined that, instead of a
statutory exception, it would be more effective for the Supreme
Court amend Rule 3-600 to specifically address the needs of

25 Whittier L. Rev. at 38-39 (2003) [hereinafter Doskow, TwoYear Journey to Nowhere].
54

Attorney General, supra note 53; Doskow, Two-Year Journey to

Nowhere, supra note 53, at 38.

“The opinion frames the issue as

one of precedence and legislative intent.”
55
56
57

COPRAC Report, supra note 7, at 2 n.4.
COPRAC Report, supra note 7, at 2.
Id.

Page 13 of 13

Id.

government attorneys.58

The State Bar Board of Governors adopted

the change and sent it to the Supreme Court for approval.59

The

Supreme Court, in a terse opinion, denied the request on the
grounds that “the proposed modifications conflict with Business
and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision(e).”60
After the Supreme Court denied the request to modify the
Rules of Professional Conduct, the Legislature resumed its

58

Id. at 3.

Rule 3-600 identifies the “client” of an attorney

representing an organization and a reporting scheme in the case
of internal wrongdoing.
(2007).

Cal. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3-600

COPRAC noted that the current focus of Rule 3-600 is

limited to attorneys who represent private organizations.

Id.

Amending rule 3-600 to address the needs of government attorneys
was the preferred approach because the AB 363 would “permit
government attorneys to make disclosure to anyone based on the
attorney’s unilateral judgment that a government official has
engaged in misconduct.”

Id.

For an in-depth study of Rule 3-

600 and the proposed changes, see infra, Sections IV(C), V(B).
59

Doskow, Two-Year Journey to Nowhere, supra note 54, at 42-43.

60

In Re Adoption of Amendments to Rule 3-600 of the Rules of

Professional Conduct, No. S106482 (Cal. 2002) (on file with the
State Bar of California); see also Don J. DeBenedictis, Justices
Reject Bar’s Whistleblower Rule, L.A. Daily J. 3 (May 14, 2002).
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debate of A.B. 363 and eventually passed a bill containing a
statutory exception to the duty of confidentiality for
government attorneys.61

However, Governor Grey Davis vetoed the

bill, fearing that the attorney-client relationship would be
weakened by the exception.62

Later, when Governor Arnold

Schwarzenegger took office, Assemblywoman Fran Pavely introduced
A.B. 2713, which also passed both houses with bipartisan
support.63

On September 28, 2004, Governor Schwarzenegger vetoed

the bill, arguing that government officials would react to the
new policy by leaving government attorneys out of the decisionmaking process.64

In 2006, Pavely again introduced another draft

61

Doskow, Two Year Journey to Nowhere, supra note 53, at 46.

62

Id. at 48 (citing Letter from Gray Davis, Governor of the State

of Cal., to Members of the Cal. State Assembly, Veto of Assembly
Bill 363 (Sept. 30, 2002), available at
http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/01-02/bill/asm/ab_03510400/ab_363_vt_20020930.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2008).
63

Manuel Valencia, Bill Analysis, available at

http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/asm/ab_16011650/ab_1612_cfa_20060118_170017_asm_floor.html (last visited
Jan. 12, 2008).
64

Letter from Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger to the Members of the

California State Assembly, Veto of Assembly Bill 2713, (Sept. 9,
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of the bill, A.B. 1612.65

The Assembly voted for the measure,

but Pavely retracted her sponsorship when it became apparent
that the Governor would not pass the bill.66

Despite the strong

political will to clarify the priorities of a government
attorney, after several failed attempted reforms, the momentum
incited by Cindy Ossias’ experience has hit an impasse.

The

next section will evaluate the existing legal framework that
creates these conflicting messages of transparency and secrecy.

2004) , available at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/0304/bill/asm/ab_2701-2750/ab_2713_vt_20040928.html (last visited
Jan. 12, 2008).
65

Assemb. B. 1612, 2005-06 Regular Sess. (Cal. 2006), available

at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/asm/ab_16011650/ab_1612_bill_20060104_amended_asm.pdf (last visited Jan.
13, 2008).
66

Marisa Huber, Ethics Year in Review, 47 Santa Clara L. Rev.

867, 904 (2007). The State Bar firmly opposed an exception to
the duty of confidentiality because it felt that the duty was
being threatened by exceptions to the duty enacted under Federal
law and in the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of
Professional Conduct .

Id. (citing Nancy McCarthy, Bar Opposes

Whistleblower Bill, Cal. St. B.J., (Apr. 2006).
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III. Existing Legal Framework
Government attorneys in California are caught between two
contradictory sets of laws; on one hand, the whistleblower
statutes promote transparency in government, while on the other,
the attorney ethics rules and statutes67 require that attorneys
keep all client communication confidential.

The whistleblower

statutes are not mandatory, but rather encourage government
officials to speak out against “improper governmental
activities”68 by immunizing them from retribution.69

In contrast,

all lawyers must comply with the duty of confidentiality; any
deviation from the rules or statutes that govern attorney
behavior could subject an attorney to discipline by the State
Bar.70

67

The only safe course of action for an attorney in Cindy

Because California attorney regulation is jointly governed by

statute and rules of professional conduct, I will also refer to
the entire system of regulation as “the ethics provisions.”
68

Cal. Gov’t Code. § 9149.21 (West 2007).

69

Id. § 8547.1.

70

Richard C. Wydick, Rex. R Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett,

California Legal Ethics 44 (5th ed. 2005) [hereinafter
California Legal Ethics].
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Ossias’ position is to maintain the government “client’s”71
absolute confidentiality.72

This alternative, however, means

that the whistleblower statutes effectively do not apply to
government attorneys.

As a result, the Legislature’s goal of

promoting transparency in government is consistently
overshadowed by the duty of confidentiality.

This section will

set forth the competing policies of government transparency and
client confidentiality.
A.

The Whistleblower Statutes
Whistleblowing is considered a form of internal dissent,

whereby a member of an organization speaks out against
wrongdoing.73

Statutes that encourage whistleblowing are

intended to promote a government employee’s ethical duty to
expose “waste, fraud, and abuse.”74

Whistleblowers are an

integral part of the system of checks and balances; they sound

71

Defining the attorney’s client is a challenging task and is

therefore the source of much debate.

See, e.g. See Wayne C.

Witkowski, Who is the Client of the Municipal Government Lawyer,
209 PLI/Crim 117, 155-56 (2007); COPRAC Report, supra note 7, at
14.
72

See COPRAC Report, supra note 7, at 18.

73

Johnson, supra note 1, at 3-4.

74

Id. at 6.
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the alarm when individuals or government entities threaten to
overstep their authority.75

Moreover, the statutes have a

deterrent effect on misconduct;76 faced with the possibility of
exposure, an official would be reticent to abuse his power
because it would be harder to hide.
Although whistleblower-type protections trace back to the
Civil War era,77 since the 1960’s officials have become concerned
about public cynicism and distrust of the government.78

Modern

whistleblower protections are one way to improve the public’s
perception of the government.79

That many states and the Federal

government have enacted whistleblower statutes80 reflects a
widespread commitment to this policy.81

75

Id. at 11.

76

See id. at 75.

77

Jonathan Macey, Getting the Word Out About Fraud: A Theoretical

Analysis of Whistleblowing and Insider Trading, 105 Mich. L.
Rev. 1899, 1904 (2007) (discussing the Union government’s policy
of paying whistleblowers who exposed fraud related to the sale
of munitions and war supplies).
78

Johnson, supra note 1, at 16.

79

Id. at 16.

80

See, e.g. Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No.

101-12, 103 Stat. 32 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 1211-1219, 1221,
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There are several provisions scattered throughout the
California Government Code that provide guidance to
whistleblowers.

The California Whistleblower Protection Act82

codifies the Legislature’s finding that “public servants best
serve the citizenry when they can be candid and honest without
reservation in conducting the people’s business.”83

An employee

is authorized to disclose improper behavior that violates any
law or regulation, or “is economically wasteful, or involves
gross misconduct, incompetency, or inefficiency.”84

Upon

receiving information about improper behavior, the State
Auditor85 is empowered to investigate the issue and report to the

1222, 3352 (2000); A.R.S. § 38-532 (2007); C.R.S.A. § 24-50.5101 (2007).
81

See Macey, supra note 77, at 1901.

“But the recent positive

publicity for whistleblowers suggests that whistleblowing is now
viewed with less suspicion--and whistleblowers as less
politically motivated and more altruistic--than was true in the
past.”

Id.

82

Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 8547-8548.5 (West 2007).

83

Id. § 8547.1.

84

Id. § 8547.2(b).

85

Although the statutes do not specifically limit to whom a

whistleblower can report, they authorize the State Auditor,
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appropriate oversight body.86

The whistleblower remains

anonymous in most circumstances;87 moreover, the statutes
expressly prohibit employees from intimidating or retaliating
against the whistleblower.88
The Act applies to all individuals “appointed by the
Governor or employed or holding office in a state agency,”89
which includes attorneys.90

Local government employees are also

protected by whistleblower provisions.91

Depending on which

version of the whistleblower statutes applies, private counsel
retained by the government may not always be protected from
being fired for speaking out against improper government
activity.92

State Legislature, or a “local agency” to receive reports from
government employees.

Id. §§ 53297, 8547.5, 9149.23.

86

Id. §§ 8547.5-.7.

87

Id. § 8547.5

88

Id. §§ 8547.8, 53298.

89

Id. § 8547.2(a).

90

Attorney General, supra note 53.

91

See Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 53296-53299.

92

See Witkin, California Procedure, Chapter IV, Agency and

Employment, § 258, p.337 (10th ed. 2005) (citing Cal. Gov’t Code
§ 8547-8548.5, which is limited to protecting “state
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The Legislature, in passing the statutes, intended to
facilitate and encourage whistleblowing to promote integrity in
government.93

However, the language of the statute makes it

clear that whistleblowing is optional.94

Furthermore, employees

are not authorized to reveal “information otherwise prohibited
by or under law.”95
B.

A California Attorney’s Duty of Confidentiality
The above-discussed whistleblowing statutes encourage

government employees, including attorneys, to act ethically by
revealing waste and wrongdoing in the government.

The competing

employees.”). Witkin is widely used by California practitioners.
But see Cal. Gov’t Code § 9149.21 (West 2007) (“state employees
and other persons should disclose . . . improper governmental
activities.”(emphasis added)).
93

Attorney General, supra note 53; Cal. Gov’t Code § 9149.21

(West 2007).
94

See Cal. Gov’t Code § 9149.21 “It is the intent of the

Legislature that state employees . . . should disclose. . .
improper government activities.”
95

Id. § 8547.3(d).

Id.

See also id. §§9149.21(d), 9149.23(c).
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duty of client confidentiality96 is one of the most important
ethical duties of a lawyer.97
Attorney behavior in California is governed by two bodies
of law: California Business and Professions Code sections 60006238 and the California Rules of Professional Conduct
(“Rules”).98

Members of the State Bar (“Bar”) could be subject

to discipline for a violation of either the Code or the Rules.99
The duty of confidentiality is codified in California
Business and Professions Code section 6068(e)(1), which mandates

96

The duty of confidentiality is broader in scope than the

attorney-client privilege, which an attorney can assert before a
Court when trying to protect a communication from being
considered in evidence.

See, e.g., In re Johnson, Cal. State

Bar Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility and Conduct, 4 Cal.
State Bar Ct. Rptr. 179, (2000); Kevin E. Mohr, California’s
Duty of Confidentiality: Is It Time for a Life-Threatening
Criminal Act Exception?, 39 San Diego L. Rev. 307, 317, n.28
(2002) (explaining that the attorney-client privilege also
applies to discovery.).
97

1 Witkin Cal. Procedure, Attorneys, § 118, p.438 (4th ed. 1997)

[hereinafter Witkin, Attorneys].
98

See California Legal Ethics, supra note 70, at 44.

99

Id.
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that an attorney “maintain inviolate the confidence, and at
every peril to himself or herself to preserve the secrets,100 of
his or her client.”101

Between 1880 and 2003, the only amendment

to the language now embodied in Section 6068(e) made the
pronouns gender-neutral.102

In 2003, the Legislature passed the

sole statutory exception to the duty of confidentiality.103

The

exception allows an attorney to reveal confidential information
where the attorney “reasonably believes the disclosure is
necessary to prevent a criminal act that the attorney reasonably

100

The statute’s use of the words “confidence” and “secrets” has

been criticized for failing to adequately define the
confidential information it seeks to protect.

See, e.g.

Proposed Cal. Rule of Prof’l Conduct 3-100 (1998)(on file with
the California State Bar).
101

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6068(e)(1) (West 2007).

102

Charles Doskow, Ethics Rules in Flux: Conscience, Clarity and

Confidentiality in California, 15 NO. 1 Prof. Law. 22, 22 (2004)
[hereinafter Doskow, Ethics Rules in Flux].
few judicially-imposed exceptions.

There were also a

California Legal Ethics,

supra note 70, at 187.
103

Doskow, Ethics Rules in Flux, supra note 102, at 22-23.
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believes is likely to result in death of, or substantial bodily
harm to, an individual.”104
The Rules of Professional Conduct merely supplement the
statutory duty of confidentiality.105

Rule 3-100 prohibits a Bar

member from revealing confidential information under Section
6068(e)(1) unless an exception applies or the client gives
informed consent.106

The Rule then reiterates the exception

mentioned in Section 6068(e)(2) and provides guidance about the
steps a Bar member should take when revealing information to
prevent a criminal act that could result in substantial injury
or death.107
The duty of confidentiality is one of the central tenets in
the attorney-client fiduciary relationship.108

It is

“fundamental” to the existence of our legal system.109

On an

104

Cal. Bus. & Prof Code § 6068(e)(2) (West 2007).

105

In fact, there was no Rule mentioning the duty until the

Legislature passed the statutory exception to confidentiality in
2004. Doskow, Ethics Rules in Flux, supra note 102, at 22.
106

See Cal. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3-100(a) (2007).

107

Id.

108

Witkin, Attorneys, supra note 97, § 118.

109

People ex rel. Department of Corporations v. SpeeDee Oil

Change Systems, Inc., 980 P.2d 371, 378 (Cal. 1999).
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individual level, confidentiality ensures that a client is
completely free to trust her lawyer with sensitive information,
thereby promoting open communication.110

This allows the

attorney to provide sound advice either in a planning or
litigation context.

Confidentiality also enriches the entire

legal system by encouraging potential clients to seek legal
advice.111

Such advice is beneficial both to the client and

arguably to the larger society.112

For attorneys, the duty of

confidentiality is a reminder of the importance of undivided
loyalty to one’s client.113

110

See, e.g., General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d

487, 500 (Cal. 1994) (“It is essential to the proper functioning
of the lawyer's role that the client be assured that matters
disclosed to counsel in confidence remain sacrosanct . . . .”).
111

Roger C. Cramton, Proposed Legislation Concerning a Lawyer’s

Duty of Confidentiality, 22 Pepp. L. Rev. 1467, 1477 (1995).
112

For example, if a company is contemplating how to dispose of

waste, consulting an attorney might not only prevent litigation
but could also protect the public from possible health risks.
113

Anderson v. Eaton, 293 P. 788, 790 (Cal. 1930) (stating that

confidentiality keeps “the honest practitioner from putting
himself in a position where he may be required to choose between
conflicting duties . . . rather than to enforce to their full
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As discussed, the existing framework results in tension
between the policies of government openness and client
confidentiality.

Although the binding duty of confidentiality

carries more weight than the statutes that merely recommend
whistleblowing,114 there may be occasions where this dynamic
could further empower an official to take advantage of the
public trust by committing fraud, knowing full well that his
attorney’s lips are sealed.
IV. Critique of the Current System
Government attorneys are torn between these competing
values of transparency and secrecy.

While the Whistleblower

statutes encourage them to listen to their conscience, the rules
and statutes governing attorney conduct mandate that they
subordinate their ethical principles to promote the underlying

extent the rights of the interest which he should alone
represent.”).
114

In fact, the statutory duty of confidentiality overrides the

effect of the whistleblower protections; the statutes do not
apply to whistleblowing prohibited by law.
9149.21.

Cal. Gov’t Code §

Therefore, since the duty of confidentiality is also

in a statute, an attorney who discloses a client’s confidential
information would not be immune to retaliation under the
whistleblower protection statutes.

Page 27 of 27

values of client confidentiality.

The first problem with this

system is that both the Legislature and the Supreme Court have
an interest in protecting the duty of confidentiality; however,
in practice, because the duty is enshrined in the statute, the
Legislature completely controls the duty.

This power imbalance

stymies debate in the legal community about possible exceptions
to this duty.

Second, the lack of an express exception to the

duty of confidentiality forces the State Bar to choose between
prosecuting an otherwise innocent attorney and ignoring the
ethics provisions, resulting in inconsistent application of the
ethics provisions.

Finally, the Rule of Professional Conduct

that governs organizational clients fails to take into account
the unique position of a government attorney.

This lack of

guidance makes it difficult for these attorneys to identify
their client for purposes of understanding to whom they owe the
duty of confidentiality.

A.

Legislative Control of the Duty of Confidentiality Prevents
the Supreme Court from Participating in the Confidentiality
Discussion
Although both the Legislature and Supreme Court

theoretically have an interest in preserving the duty of
confidentiality, in practice, the Legislature alone controls the
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duty.

This section will demonstrate that housing the duty of

confidentiality in the Business and Professions Code impedes the
Supreme Court from exercising its inherent power over the duty
of confidentiality.

This section will discuss the basis for

each branch’s control over confidentiality and explain the
dynamics of the power-sharing between the two branches.
1.

The Evolution of the California Legislature and
Supreme Court’s Shared Power over Attorney Conduct

The Legislature and the Supreme Court both have an interest
in promoting good attorney conduct.

The Supreme Court must

ensure that the legal system functions properly; this is one of
the Court’s main duties under the California Constitution.115

In

contrast, the Legislature seeks to protect the public at large116
by preventing attorneys from abusing their position of power.
Therefore, the Legislature is also empowered to regulate
attorney conduct; it “may put reasonable restrictions upon
constitutional functions of the Courts provided they do not
defeat or materially impair the exercise of these functions.”117

115

See Cal. Const. art. VI, § 1; In re Attorney Discipline

System, 967 P.2d 49, 54 (Cal. 1998).
116
117

In re Attorney Discipline System, 967 P.2d at 61.
Brydonjack v. State Bar of California, 281 P. 1018, 1020

(1929).
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The California Legislature has a long history of regulating
attorney conduct.

In 1927, the California Legislature formally

adopted the State Bar Act (“Act”),118 which is now a part of the
California Business & Professions Code (“Code”).119
created an integrated bar.120

The Act

Prior to the passage of the act,

existing voluntary bar associations had experienced difficulty
in enforcing professional standards and assimilating the large
waves of recently settled attorneys.121

Moreover, laypersons

118

Witkin, Attorneys supra note 97, § 358.

119

See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6000-6428 (West 2007).

This

part of the Business and Professions Code “may be cited as the
State Bar Act.”
120

Id. § 6000.

In an “integrated bar,” all practicing attorneys in the state

must be members. See Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S.
1, 5 (1990).

Additionally, the California Constitution now

mandates that “[e]very person admitted and licensed to practice
law in this State” be a member of the State Bar.”

Cal. Const.

art. VI, § 9.
121

Corinne Lathrop Gilb, Self-Regulating Professions and The

Public Welfare: A Case Study of the California Bar 36 (1956)
(Ph.D. dissertation, Radcliffe College).
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posing as lawyers had created a fiercely competitive market for
clients.122
The Act officially recognized the Supreme Court’s tradition
of assuming jurisdiction over attorney discipline.123

The Act

also established the State Bar, a “pubic corporation”124 that
helps the Supreme Court carry out its disciplinary duties.125
The State Bar is merely an “administrative assistant or adjunct
of [the] Court;”126 the Court is the ultimate arbiter of
admittance to practice law, suspension, and disbarment.127

122

Gilb, supra note 121, at 36-37.

One observer noted that out

of 6,000 attorneys working in San Francisco, only 600 were
actually legally authorized to do so.
123

Id.

See In re Stevens, 241 P. 88, 92 (Cal. 1925) (holding that

the Supreme Court has “original jurisdiction to determine
applications for restoration to practice of attorneys and
counselors at law after disbarment.”).
124

Cal. Const. art. VI, § 9.

125

In re Attorney Discipline System, 967 P.2d 49, 58-59 (Cal.

1998).
126

Id. at 59.

127

See Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1, 11-12

(1990).
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Once the State Bar Act codified the California Supreme
Court’s disciplinary power over attorneys, the California
Supreme Court in 1928 adopted its own Rules of Professional
Conduct.128

Today’s Rules of Professional Conduct patch together

aspects of the American Bar Association (“ABA”) Model Rules, the
old ABA Model Code, and earlier California legal ethics rules.129
To amend a Rule of Professional Conduct, the State Bar Board of
Governors adopts a draft and submits it to the Supreme Court for
approval.130
In California, like in most states, the Supreme Court
oversees the entire judicial system.131

“[T]he power to regulate

the practice of law, including the power to admit and to
discipline attorneys, has long been recognized to be among the
inherent powers of the article VI [of the California
Constitution] Courts.”132

Despite the fact that this power

128

Witkin, Attorneys, supra note 97, § 476.

129

California Legal Ethics, supra note 70.

130

See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6077 (West 2007).

131

In re Attorney Discipline System, 967 P.2d 49, 54 (Cal. 1998);

see Cal. Const. art. VI, § 1.
132

In re Attorney Discipline System, 967 P.2d at 54.

“Admission

to the bar is a judicial function, and members of the bar are
officers of the Court, subject to discipline by the Court.
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belongs to the Supreme Court, some provisions of the State Bar
Act directly affect attorney conduct.133

One of the State Bar

Act’s functions is regulating behavior “which would constitute
the unauthorized practice of law if performed by a layman.”134
The Act defines the duties of an attorney,135 among them the duty
of confidentiality.136

Additionally, the Act includes provisions

Hence, under the constitutional doctrine of separation of
powers, the Court has inherent and primary regulatory power
[over admission to practice law].” (citations omitted) Witkin,
Attorneys, supra note 97, § 356, p.438.
133

Doskow, Ethics Rules in Flux, supra note 63.

134

Baron v. City of Los Angeles, 469 P.2d 353, 358 (1970).

Given

the widespread abuse of the “attorney at law” title, it is
logical that the 1927 Act sought to exclude laymen from
practice.

See Gilb, supra note 121,at 36-37.

135

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6068 (West 2007).

136

Id. § 6068(e).

As noted, infra Section III(B), the duty of

confidentiality is a key component of an attorney’s fiduciary
relationship to her client.

Consistent with the State Bar Act’s

goals, confidentiality is one of the duties that sets a Bar
member apart from other holders of Juris Doctor degrees.
Bus. & Prof. Code § 6067.

Cal.

“Every person on his admission shall
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that govern fee agreements and advertising, the violation of
which could lead to discipline.137

Sections like these equate to

direct regulation of attorney conduct.138
The State Bar Act provoked immediate controversy; however,
in State Bar of California v. Superior Court of Los Angeles
County,139 the California Supreme Court upheld the Act.

140

The

Court noted that attorneys constitute the largest and most
influential group of professionals.141

As officers of the

Courts, attorneys have a duty both to promote the administration
of justice and to serve the public at large.142

However, because

take an oath . . . and faithfully to discharge the duties of any
attorney at law . . . .”

Id.

137

Doskow, Ethics Rules in Flux, supra note 102.

138

Id.

139

278 P. 432 (Cal. 1929).

140

Id. at 439.

141

Id. at 435.

142

Id. at 435.

Arguably, an attorney’s duty to the public is

greater than her duty to the Court. See Bradley R. Kirk, Note,
Milking the New Sacred Cow: The Supreme Court Limits the
Peremptory Challenge on Racial Grounds in Powers v. Ohio and
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 19 Pepp. L. Rev. 691, 722
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being a lawyer is a prerequisite to becoming a judge, the Court
implied that it was necessary to have another branch keep watch
over the judiciary.143

Society

is to be safeguarded against the ignorances or evil
dispositions of those who may be masquerading beneath the
cloak of the legal and supposedly learned and upright
profession.

It is to be noted also that from the body of

the legal profession it is required . . . the justices and
judges of all Courts of record and of certain other
subordinate tribunals must be chosen.

144

In other words, fear of attorney omnipotence justified
legislative oversight of professional conduct.145

Consistent

with this opinion, the California Supreme Court has never held

n.267 (1992) (discussing State Bar of California v. Superior
Court, 278 P. at 435).
143

State Bar of California v. Superior Court, 278 P. at 435.

“From almost the inception of our state government statutory
provision has been made for the admission, disbarment,
suspension, or disciplining of members of the legal profession.”
Id.
144
145

See id. at 435.
See Hustedt v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 636 P.2d 1139, 1143

n.7, (Cal. 1981) .
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that the State Bar Act’s provisions that regulate attorney
conduct are an unconstitutional exercise of legislative
authority.146
The California Legislature, out of a concern for the public
welfare, is authorized under its police power to create laws
that govern the practice of the law.147

Similarly, the

California Supreme Court, through overseeing the Rules of
Professional Conduct and the disciplinary system, seeks to
protect the public.148

The Supreme Court enacts Rules of

Professional Conduct to set standards based on the Court’s

146

Ethics Rules in Flux, supra note 133; see, e.g. Lebbos v.

State Bar, 806 P.2d 317, 323, (Cal. 1991) (indicating that the
State Bar Act is not “an unconstitutional delegation of judicial
power to the State Bar” because the California Supreme Court
retains the ability to discipline attorneys).
147

In re Attorney Discipline System, 967 P.2d 49, 61 (Cal. 1998);

Hustedt, 636 P.2d at 1143.
148

Cal. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1-100 (2007); see Howard v.

Babcock, 863 P.2d 150, 162 (Cal. 1993) (quoting Ames v. State
Bar, 506 P.2d 625, 629 (Cal. 1973)).
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perception of what constitutes appropriate legal practice.149
When these standards are not met, members of the public can
vindicate their rights by reporting their attorney’s misconduct
to the State Bar.150

Therefore, the Supreme Court’s and the

Legislature’s goals dovetail with respect to attorney
discipline.

While the Legislature must protect the public

welfare,151 the Court must be vigilant to ensure the reliability
of the system it oversees.152

149

See Cal. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1-100 (2007).

The Rules

are designed “to protect the public and to promote respect and
confidence in the legal profession.”
150

Id.

See, e.g., State Bar of California, The State Bar of

California: What Does It Do?

How Does it Work?,

http://www.calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/whowhat1.pdf (last visited
Jan. 13, 2008).
151

In re Attorney Discipline System, 967 P.2d 49, 61 (Cal. 1998).

152

See In re Lavine, 41 P.2d 161, 162 (Cal. 1935).
[T]he right to practice law not only presupposes in its
possessor integrity, legal standing, and attainment, but
also the exercise of a special privilege, highly personal
and partaking of the nature of a public trust, the granting
of which privilege to an individual is everywhere conceded
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2.

The Practical Effect of This Shared Power

Although in theory the Legislature and the Supreme Court
both enjoy power over the duty of confidentiality, in practice,
the Legislature’s role overshadows that of the Supreme Court
because the duty has always been enshrined in a statute.153

An

example of this dynamic is the story of how the Rule of
Professional Conduct 3-100 came into existence.

Before 1987,

there was no mention of the duty of confidentiality in the Rules
of Professional Conduct.154

In 1987, the State Bar first

proposed that the Supreme Court adopt Rule 3-100, which would
borrow section 6068(e)’s concept of confidentiality and include
five express exceptions to the duty.155

The proposed Rule

to be the exercise of a judicial function (citations
omitted).

Id.

153

See Mohr, supra note 96, at 366.

154

See Cal. Rules of Prof’l Conduct Ch. 3 (1989-1992), available

at
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/state/calbar/calbar_generic.jsp?cid=101
58&id=3502.

Until 2003, when Rule 3-100 was enacted, the Rules

did not mention the duty of confidentiality.
Rules In Flux, supra note 102.
155

Mohr, supra note 96, at 369-70.
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See Doskow, Ethics

defined the terms “confidence” and “secrets” to clarify the
potentially ambiguous language in section 6068(e).156
In deciding to decline adopting this new Rule, the Court
did not provide its reasons.157

However, the Court, in a letter

to the President of the State Bar, “suggested that if the rule
was intended to permit disclosure in a proceeding where the
attorney-client evidentiary privilege attached, the Supreme
Court might not have the authority to approve such a rule.”158
In other words, the Court feared intruding on the Legislature’s
jurisdiction by creating an exception to the duty of
confidentiality without a corresponding Evidence Code exception
to the attorney-client privilege.159
In 1992, the State Bar again submitted a proposed rule to
the Supreme Court that defined the duty of confidentiality and

156

Id. at 369 n.240.

157

Id. at 372.

158

Id. at 370 n.241.

159

Id. at 374.

Note that the attorney-client privilege is

narrower than the duty of confidentiality, so to create an
exception to the larger duty of confidentiality would undermine
the Legislature’s power over the attorney-client privilege.
supra, Section III(B).
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See

proposed on one exception to the duty.160

The exception was

limited to preventing criminal acts that could result in serious
bodily injury.161

This version also included a “safe harbor,”

whereby a lawyer who disclosed client information under the
applicable exception would not be subject to discipline by the
State Bar.162

The Supreme Court again rejected this suggestion

without explanation.163
In 1998, the State Bar proposed another version of rule 3100 that included the exception for the criminal acts that might
result in substantial bodily harm.164

This version abandoned the

“safe harbor” provision;165 however, it suffered the same fate as
its predecessors, receiving another curt denial.166
A few years later, in response to the Ossias case, the
State Bar tried to provide guidance for future whistleblowers by
clarifying the relationship of a government attorney to her

160

Mohr, supra note 96 at 370-71.

161

Id.

162

Id.

163

Id.

164

Id. at 371.

165

Id. n.246.

166

Id. at 371-72.

Page 40 of 40

client.167

In deciding to deny the Bar’s request, the Court

became slightly more generous when it provided a one-sentence
reason for rejecting the Rule, citing a conflict with the
provisions of section 6068(e) of the Business and Professions
Code.168
It was only after the Legislature passed California
Business and Professions Code section 6068(e)(2),169 the criminal
act exception to the duty of confidentiality, that the Supreme
Court was willing to approve a Rule that mentioned the duty of
confidentiality.

The current version of Rule 3-100 merely

refers to the duty mentioned in section 6068(e)(1) and explains
how to implement the exception in section 6068(e)(2).170

167

See infra, Section II(B).

168

In re Adoption of Amendments to Rule 3-600 of the Rules of

Professional Conduct, No. S104682, (Cal. May 10, 2002) (the
request to amend Rule 3-600 “is denied because the proposed
modifications conflict with Business and Professions Code
section 6068, subdivision (e).”) (on file with the California
State Bar); see also Don J. DeBenedictis, Justices Reject Bar's
Whistleblower Rule, L.A. Daily J. 3 (May 14, 2002).
169

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6068(e)(2) (West 2007).

170

Cal. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3-100 (2007)
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With the help of the State Bar’s input and proposals, the
Court has had ample opportunities to clarify the scope of the
duty and adopt appropriate exceptions.

However, the Court has

rebuffed the legal community’s repeated attempts to refine the
duty of confidentiality.

In the future, the Supreme Court

should at least provide its reasons for declining to adopt
Rules, if for no other reason than to inform the State Bar of
which modifications might be acceptable.
Taking together the Supreme Court’s reference to 6068(e)
when rejecting proposed Rule 3-600171 and the fact that the Court
changed the Rules only after the Legislature had enacted the
statutory exception to the duty of confidentiality, it appears
that the Supreme Court has been hesitant to even consider
modifying the duty for fear of stepping on the Legislature’s
toes.172

However, as noted, the duty of confidentiality is

171In Re Adoption of Amendments to Rule 3-600 of the Rules of
Professional Conduct, No. S106482 (Cal. 2002) (on file with the
State Bar of California).
172

Id. at 379.

“These rejections probably do not reflect a deep-

seated antipathy . . . on the Court’s part to exceptions to the
duty of confidentiality.

Rather, they more likely evince the

Court’s belief that it does not have the authority to upend the
absolute language” of section 6068(e), in spite of the

Page 42 of 42

central to the existence of the legal system, and therefore
falls within the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction.

The Supreme

Court’s deferential approach to adopting rules that deal with
confidentiality has allowed the Legislature to “defeat or
materially impair the exercise of [the Supreme Court’s]
functions.”173

Therefore, keeping the duty of confidentiality in

the Business and Professions Code would further prevent the
Supreme Court from exercising its due power over the duty of
confidentiality.
B.

If Immunity Is Uncertain, Few Will Dare to Speak Out
When there is a conflict between the mandatory duty of

confidentiality and the optional whistleblower statutes, the
State Bar is forced to bring disciplinary action against a
government attorney who blows the whistle.174

However, if the

State Bar chooses to favor transparency policies by not
following the plain language of the ethics provisions, its
enforcement procedure appears subjective and arbitrary.

On one

hand, any appearance of inconsistent application of the rules

exceptions to attorney-client privilege in the Evidence Code.
Id.
173

Brydonjack v. State Bar of California, 281 P. 1018, 1020

(1929).
174

Attorney General, supra note 53.
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undermines the credibility of the State Bar.

On the other,

otherwise innocent attorneys who perform a valuable public
service might lose their livelihoods, despite statutory language
that encourages them to speak out.
The way in which the State Bar Trial Counsel handled the
Ossias case illustrates the community’s inclination to reward
government attorney whistleblowing in spite of the clear
statutory language to the contrary.175

After initiating an

investigation into Ossias’ disclosures, the State Bar’s Office
of Trial Counsel communicated to Ossias’ attorney its decision
to discontinue the investigation.176

The Deputy Trial Counsel

declined to analyze whether the Department of Insurance was
Ossias’ client and whether she had breached her duty of
confidentiality by providing documents to the legislative
committees.177

Instead, Ossias was not disciplined because her

conduct “(1) [] was consistent with the spirit of the
Whistleblower Protection Act; (2) [] advanced important public
policy considerations bearing on the responsibilities of the
office of insurance commissioner; and (3) [was] not otherwise

175

Steedman Letter, supra note 21.

176

Id.

177

Doskow, Two-Year Journey to Nowhere), supra note 53, at 42-43

(2003); see Steedman Letter, supra note 21.
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subject to prosecution under the guidelines set forth in this
office’s Statement of Disciplinary Priorities.”178
The Trial Counsel’s letter does not adequately explain its
decision because there is no discussion of how Ossias’ actions
apply to the legal framework governing attorney discipline.
Instead of directly attacking the issues, the letter presented
flimsy reasons for ending the investigation.

Although this

approach was beneficial to Ossias, it cannot be used as any
indication of how the State Bar will approach future
whistleblowers.179
The first reason for exonerating Ossias--that she acted in
the “spirit” of the act--was not at issue;180 rather, the Trial
Counsel was tasked with deciding whether she had violated her
duty under the provisions regulating attorney conduct.181

The

second reason, that her behavior promoted the Department’s
public policy considerations, essentially means that her
“conduct assisted her client, the Department of Insurance, in

178

Steedman Letter, supra note 21.

179

Zitrin and Langford, supra note 14, at 552.

180

Indeed, the whistleblower laws make no mention of immunity

from State Bar disciplinary action.

See, e.g. Cal. Gov’t Code

§§ 8547-8548.5 (West 2007).
181

Doskow, Two Year Journey to Nowhere, supra note 53, at 41.
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doing its job.”182

Public policy is not an excuse for violating

an attorney’s ethical obligations.183

The third and final

reason, that the behavior was “not otherwise subject to
prosecution,”184 was actually an exercise in prosecutorial
discretion.185

In reality, the Bar was attempting to appease the

majority of the bar members, public and Legislature, all of whom
firmly supported Ossias’ actions.186
Since Ossias was a likeable whistleblower, her actions were
widely publicized, and Quackenbush’s behavior was so egregious,
the Trial Counsel had little choice but to bow the pressures of
public opinion and discontinue the investigation.187

Perhaps in

failing to discuss whether Ossias had complied with the
statutes, the Office of Trial Counsel recognized that it was not
in a position to fashion its own exception to the duty of
confidentiality.

The letter is of little use to future

attorneys in Ossias’ position.188

Furthermore, the Bar

182

Id.

183

See id.

184

Steedman Letter, supra note 21.

185

Journey to Nowhere, supra note 131, at 41.

186

Id. at 40-41.

187

Id.

188

Zitrin and Langford, supra note 13, at 552.
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explicitly stated that the letter contained no public policy
implications.189
At the very least, in Ossias’ case, the State Bar was
reluctant to allow the stringent duty of confidentiality to
override the whistleblower policies, meaning that the duty of
confidentiality may not be as absolute as it seems.

In other

words, depending on the egregiousness and public policy
implications of the act that the whistleblower reveals, the
disciplinary arm of the State Bar might be willing to look the
other way.190

The consequence of this ad-hoc approach creates

uncertainty for government attorneys; they are unable to
realistically assess the risks and benefits of disclosure
because they do not know whether they will be disciplined, and
if so, to what extent.191

If an attorney is not sure whether it

is safe to speak out, she will choose to be silent.

There is a

public cost to silence: a watered-down approach to government
transparency.
Some might argue that the duty of confidentiality should
always be favored over transparency policies, even in the case
of government attorneys.

After all, it is a duty that sets Bar

189

Steedman Letter, supra note 26.

190

See Doskow, Ethics Rules in Flux, supra note --, at 23.

191

Id.
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members apart from other non-accredited attorneys.192

Although

this is true, government attorneys are in a unique position.
They, like their fellow civil servants, are repositories of the
public trust and are paid out of tax money to serve the public.
To allow civil servants to use a government attorney’s services
to commit a fraud on the public does little to enrich society.
Public officials cannot expect the same level of confidentiality
as a private client.193
In sum, the combination of ethics provisions and
whistleblower statutes does little to support the important
public policy of transparency.

However, where the conditions

are right, there may be future cases that warrant breaching the
duty of confidentiality.

Creating a narrowly tailored standard

to guide future government attorney whistleblowers will not
erode all confidentiality.

The provisions of a possible

exception to the duty of confidentiality for government
attorneys are beyond the scope of this article; however, in the
interim, a change in the structure of the duty of
confidentiality could make the system more amenable to adopting
important policies.194

192

See supra, Section III(B).

193

See In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

194

See infra, Section V(A)(1).
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C.

“Government as Client” Is Not the Same As “Organization as
Client”195
The tension between the competing obligations of

whistleblowing and confidentiality is exacerbated by the fact
that the government attorney is representing an organizational
client with a non-traditional power structure.

Rule 3-600

defines the “client” of an attorney that represents an
organization; however, the type of client the Rule contemplates
does not include the government.

There are two main ways in

which the Rule fails to take into account the unique situation
of government attorneys.

First, and most importantly, it is not

clear to whom a public attorney owes the duty of
confidentiality.196

Second, the Rule’s reporting scheme for non-

governmental organizations does not take into account the
concerns of a governmental agency.197
1.

195

The Structure and Content of Rule 3-600

Cal. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3-600 (2007).

as Client” is the heading of this Rule.

“Organization

Id.

196

COPRAC Report, supra note 7 at 14.

197

See Richard C. Solomon, Wearing Many Hats: Confidentiality

and Conflicts of Interest Issues for the California Public
Lawyer, 25 Sw. U. L. Rev 265, 295-96 (1996).
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Rule 3-600 defines an organizational client as the entity
itself, acting through the highest authorized agent.198

Where an

employee acts in a manner that could injure the organization,
the attorney is prohibited from breaching her duty of
confidentiality under California Business and Professions Code
Section 6068(e).199

In this situation, the attorney has the

option to 1. urge reconsideration;200 2. report the deviant
behavior to a higher internal authority, or if necessary, to the
highest person who is authorized to represent the
organization;201 or 3. discontinue representation in accordance
with the mandatory resignation procedures listed in 3-700.202
Furthermore, where the officers, directors, shareholders or
employees’ interests conflict with the organization’s interests,
the attorney is expected to explain that she is representing the
entire organization, not them as individuals.203

The lawyer

“should not be influenced by the personal desires of any person

198

Cal. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3-600(A) (2007).

199

Id. R. 3-600(B).

200

Id. R. 3-600(B)(1).

201

Id. R. 3-600(B)(2).

202

Id. R. 3-600(C).

203

See R. 3-600(D); Cal. State Bar Comm. Prof’l Responsibility,

Op. 1989-113 (1989).
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or organization”204 because the only client is the “corporate
entity actually represented.”205
2.

The Rule’s Definition of “Client” Does Not Apply to
Government Entities.

The central problem with this Rule is that the concept of
“client” does not apply to government attorneys.206

If the

government client were the “entity itself, acting through the
highest authorized agent,”207 then the public servants in a
government organization would be working for a head official
with absolute power.

However, unlike in a corporation,208 the

head official of a government agency does not have complete

204

Cal. State Bar Comm. Prof’l Responsibility, Op. 1989-113

(1989) (citing Model Code of Prof’l Responsibility, EC 5-18).
205

Id.

206

See COPRAC Report, supra note 7, at 4.

207

Cal. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3-600 (2007).

208

Id.

“In representing an organization, a member shall

conform his or her representation to the concept that the client
is the organization itself, acting through its highest
authorized officer, employee, body, or constituent overseeing
the particular engagement.”

Id.
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managerial power over the agency.

The “client”209 of a

traditional corporation allocates resources, passes bylaws, and
authorizes transactions.
In contrast, in the case of a government entity, the
Legislature may allocate funding and regulate the organizational
structure while the executive branch appoints an agency
director.210

This multi-layered approach to administrating a

governmental organization makes it unclear who has the ultimate
responsibility for the organization.211

Without that

information, the attorney has no notice about to whom she owes
the duty of confidentiality.
3.

The Rule’s Contemplated Reporting Scheme Does Not
Apply to Government Organizations.

209

The “highest authorized officer, employee, body, or

constituent overseeing the particular engagement.”
210

See generally Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code (West 2007).

211

Attorney General, supra note 53, at 2.

Id.

(speculating about who

is the “client” of an attorney representing the Medical Board of
California: “the board itself, its executive director, the
Department of Consumer Affairs of which the board is a part, the
State and Consumer Services Agency in which the department is
situated, or possibly someone else such as the Governor?”).
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Rule 3-600 describes the steps an attorney can take to
report wrongdoing within the organization to the “highest
internal authority that can act on behalf of the
organization.”212

However, this scheme does not make sense in

the government context.

First, the organizational harm

described in the rule does not reflect the concerns of a
governmental organization.

Second, the lack of a definition of

the “client” means that the attorney does not know to whom she
is authorized to report this harm.
The type of harm a governmental organization may suffer is
different from Rule’s designated harms.213

For this reason, a

government attorney might not be able to determine which types
of activities merit reporting.

The Rule recognizes two types of

harm: “a violation of law reasonably imputable to the
organization” and behavior “which is likely to cause substantial
injury to the organization.”214

Since government organizations

are not motivated to earn a profit, the types of “injury” a
government organization could suffer are inherently different
from those of a regular corporation.

212
213

While corporations risk

Rule 3-600(B)(2).
See Solomon, supra note 197, at 295; see also COPRAC Report at

15.
214

Cal. Rule of Prof’l Conduct R. 3-600(B)(2007).
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lost profits, civil liability, or bankruptcy if an agent acts
maliciously, a government organization will not be shut down
because of a few bad eggs.215

The government entity may risk

public distrust; however, its existence will not be threatened
in the same way as a corporation.216

In turn, because this

concept of “harm” to a government organization is so ambiguous,
it is also subjective and difficult to identify.

Therefore, the

current language of Rule 3-600 that authorizes an attorney to
report on “harmful” activities does not provide sufficient
guidance to government attorneys.
Moreover, if a government attorney feels compelled to
report wrongdoing, Rule 3-600’s reporting scheme would be
ineffective.

Determining who is the “highest internal

authority”217 to whom the attorney may report is difficult in the
government context because “highest” and “internal” are open to
interpretation unless they are specifically defined in the
Rules.

For example, Cindy Ossias believed that the public was

her client, in particular because the mission of the CDI is to

215

See Solomon, supra note 197, at 296.

216

Id. at 297.

217

Cal. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3-600(B)(2) (2007).
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protect consumers.218

Depending on how one chooses to identify

the government client, the “highest internal authority” could be
the director of the agency, the legislative sub-committee that
oversees the agency, the speaker of the Assembly, or the
Governor.219

Since government attorneys currently have no

guidance on the identity of their “client,” they do not know to
whom they owe the duty of confidentiality, and therefore, must
guess to how they can safely report organizational wrongdoing.
V. Proposal
As illustrated above, the current legal framework makes it
difficult for government attorneys to reconcile these competing
policies.

This article proposes two solutions to the challenges

discussed above.

First, the Bar should propose that the duty of

confidentiality be moved from the California Business and
Professions Code to the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Second,

the State Bar should identify the client of an attorney
representing a governmental organization and incorporate this

218

E-mail from Cindy Ossias, Senior Staff Counsel, California

Department of Insurance, to Jessica Shpall, Loyola Law School
(Jan. 14, 2008, 10:54:00 PST) (on file with author).
219

See Witkowski, supra note 71.
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new definition into a separate Rule of Professional Conduct.220
These solutions are independent of one another; both should be
adopted, but if that is not possible, implementing either
alternative could significantly improve the current situation.
This section will explain how the proposals address the problems
with the current legal framework, consider limitations to the
proposals, and explore how to overcome these limitations.
A.

Transfer the Duty of Confidentiality to the Rules of
Professional Conduct
1.

Proposal

The duty of confidentiality should be moved from the
California Business and Professions Code to the Rules of
Professional Conduct because doing so would strike the
appropriate constitutional balance between the Supreme Court’s
concern for the legal system and the Legislature’s desire to
protect the public.

As noted, the Supreme Court has rebuffed

all efforts by the Bar to modify the duty of confidentiality,
apparently because the Court believes that it is powerless to do
so as long as the duty is codified.

220

221

This does a disservice to

Another option is to change the language of Rule 3-600 to

reflect the needs of government attorneys; however, adopting a
new Rule would be more user-friendly.
221

See supra, Section IV(A)(2).
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the legal system because the State Bar and the Supreme Court are
in the best position to shape the duty of confidentiality.
First, the Supreme Court has inherent power to regulate
attorneys.222

As noted above, the Legislature is allowed to

share this power subject to certain limits.223

In the past, when

the Supreme Court has perceived that the Legislature is
preventing it from exercising this power over the legal system,
the Supreme Court has re-asserted its right to act
unilaterally.224

222

For example, although the State Bar functions

See, e.g. In Re Discipline System, 967 P.2d 49, 55 (Cal.

1998).
223

See Id. at 55-56.

224See, e.g., Id. at 49. (upholding the Court’s power to set bar
dues after the Legislature had failed to do so); Hustedt v.
Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, 636 P.2d 1139 (1981)(
holding that the Legislature, in authorizing the Workers’
Compensation Appeals Board to discipline an attorney, had
undermined the Court’s jurisdiction over disciplinary
proceedings); Merco Construction Engineers, Inc. v. Municipal
Court, 581 P.2d 636 (1978) (holding that the Legislature, by
allowing a corporate officer who was not an attorney to appear
in a civil action, usurped the Court’s power to authorize
admission to practice law).
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as an arm of the Supreme Court, the Legislature typically
designates how much the Bar can collect in dues.225

In 1998,

however, then-governor Wilson vetoed a bill enabling the State
Bar to collect yearly dues of $458.00 and the Bar’s disciplinary
system became severely backlogged due to lack of funding.226
Since the disciplinary system is the Court’s mechanism for
ensuring good attorney conduct and keeping the legal system
running, the Court held that it was necessary to impose the
fees.227
Likewise, the Court’s reticence to change the Rules of
Professional Conduct for fear of affecting the statutory duty of
confidentiality228 has allowed the Legislature to “defeat or
materially impair the exercise of these functions.”229

The duty

of confidentiality primarily exists230 to enable the legal system

225

In Re Discipline System, 967 P.2d at 52.

226

Id. at 54.

227

Id. at 52.

228

Supra, section IV(A)(2).

229

Brydonjack v. State Bar of California, 281 P. 1018, 1020

(1929).
230

Although the duty also seeks to protect the public from harm,

the main purpose is to enable clients to rely on their
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to function,231 and therefore is an essential aspect of the
Court’s power to regulate attorney conduct.232

Therefore, the

Court should follow its reasoning from In Re Discipline System233
by reasserting its due power over the duty of confidentiality.
Second, the State Bar and its respective committees are in
the best position to study the dynamics of the duty of
confidentiality.

Because the Bar234 spends the bulk of its time

and energy adjudicating issues that evaluate whether a
particular attorney’s behavior complies with the disciplinary
rules,235 it is familiar with the pitfalls of the current ethics
provisions and therefore is in a position to suggest potential
revisions.

Furthermore, the Bar has subcommittees staffed with

ethics experts who are tasked with researching the Rules of

attorneys, thereby ensuring that clients make use of the legal
system. See supra, Section III(B).
231
232

See supra, Section IV(2).
People ex rel. Department of Corporations v. SpeeDee Oil

Change Systems, Inc., 980 P.2d 371, 378 (Cal. 1999).
233

967 P.2d 49, 55 (Cal. 1998)

234

And, to a lesser degree, the Court.

235

In re Attorney Discipline System, 967 P.2d 49, 58-59 (Cal.

1998)(noting that the State Bar assists the Court in
disciplining attorneys).
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Professional Conduct.236

For example, the principal purpose of

the Bar’s Commission for the Revision of the Rules of
Professional Conduct is to strengthen the Rules of Professional
Conduct by staying abreast of developments in the field of
professional responsibility.237

By placing the duty of

confidentiality within the Rules, the Commission’s contributions
would not fall on deaf ears, as they sometimes have in the past,
but might have a better chance of being implemented.

This would

mean that any changes to the duty of confidentiality would be
grounded in a careful study of the current trends in legal
ethics.
Third, housing the duty of confidentiality in the Rules of
Professional Conduct would provide greater flexibility for

236

Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility and Discipline,

http://calbar.ca.gov/state/calbar/calbar_generic.jsp?cid=10130&i
d=1104 (last visited Jan. 13, 2008).
237

See Charter of the Comm. for the Revision of the Rules of

Prof’l Conduct, available at
http://calbar.ca.gov/state/calbar/calbar_generic.jsp?cid=10129
(last visited Nov. 16, 2007).

Among the Committees goals are

“eliminating ambiguities” and “fostering the evolution of a
national standard with respect to professional responsibility
issues.”

Id.
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modification without eroding the duty.

This is because the

Court is less swayed by political currents and can act
independently of other branches238 while still remaining
accountable to the public.

Because the legislative process

requires continuous negotiation between political parties, the
Legislature is “probably more susceptible than the Court to the
pressures of various interested parties, and the compromises
that would likely ensue might weaken the proposed
legislation.”239

Although such negotiations might be appropriate

for other issues such as education and transportation, the duty
of confidentiality is vital to the attorney-client relationship
and the broader legal system.240

The Supreme Court, therefore,

is best positioned to oversee the duty because it would be able
to independently evaluate the merits of a proposed change.
Although the Court does not face the same political
pressure as the Legislature, there are important checks on its
power to regulate attorney conduct.

First, unlike Federal

judges, California Supreme Court Justices do not enjoy life
tenure; rather, they are re-elected every twelve years.241

238

Mohr, supra note 96, at 383.

239

Id. at 383.

240

Id.

241

Cal. Const. art. VI, § 16; Mohr, supra note 96, at 383.
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Although twelve years may be a long time for a constituent to
remember a Justice’s controversial decision, the Justices are
still subject to some degree of accountability.

Moreover, the

Court and the State Bar are both “sensitive to the concerns of
their constituents”242 and therefore are unlikely to make any
drastic changes to the duty of confidentiality.

The policy of

collecting public comments on proposed rules seeks to
incorporate the views of the public at large and the many
stakeholders within the Bar.243

As a result of public comments,

the State Bar has even revised and withdrawn proposed rules.244
This respect for the legal community’s input, as well as the
fact that the Justices have to earn their re-election, will keep
the Court from unduly modifying the duty of confidentiality.
Finally, moving the duty to the Rules of Professional
Conduct would not undermine the long history of strict
confidentiality in California.245

The Court has a strong record

of protecting the attorney-client relationship.246

242

Moreover, the

Mohr, supra note 96 at 383.

243

Id.

244

Id.

245

Id.

246

Id. (citing Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d

487, 503 (cal. 1994); see also People ex rel. Department of
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State Bar is unlikely to bow to peer pressure when considering
exceptions to the duty of confidentiality.

For example, the

State Bar opposed Assemblywoman Pavely’s 2006 bill because it
feared that the duty of confidentiality was being threatened.247
The Court and State Bar’s combined commitment to confidentiality
is grounded in a desire and responsibility to ensure the
integrity of the legal system;248 moving the duty of
confidentiality to the Rules would therefore not decrease its
effectiveness because the Court understands that it is essential
that clients trust their attorneys with sensitive information.249

Corporations v. SpeeDee Oil Change Systems, Inc., 980 P.2d 371,
378 (Cal. 1999).
247

Huber, supra note 66.

Additionally, the California Bar has

aggressively opposed the Sarbanes-Oxley rules that create new
exceptions to the duty of confidentiality.

Thomas G. Bost,

Corporate Lawyers After the Big Quake: The Conceptual Fault Line
in the Professional Duty of Confidentiality, 19 Geo. J. Legal
Ethics 1089, 1126-1136 (2006).
248

See supra, Section IV(A)(1).

249

People ex rel. Dept. of Corporations v. SpeeDee Oil Change

Systems, Inc., 980 P.2d 371, 378, (Cal. 1999).

“The paramount

concern must be to preserve public trust in the scrupulous
administration of justice and the integrity of the bar.”
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Id.

2.

Addressing the Limitations of this Proposal

A limitation to this proposal is that the Legislature has
presided over the duty of confidentiality for more than 130
years.250

This proposal would require all three branches of

government to agree that this long-held tradition is worth
changing.251

Although the statutory duty is deeply entrenched in

California’s legal history, transferring the duty to the Rules
of Professional Conduct would strengthen the attorney-client
relationship by allowing the Legislature and the Supreme Court
to share power over communications issues.
First, the Legislature would retain some degree of control
over confidentiality.252

The attorney-client privilege, an

important subset of client confidentiality, would remain under
the Legislature’s control.253

The Supreme Court has consistently

upheld the Legislature’s role in this respect.254
Second, the Legislature’s goal in regulating the duty of
confidentiality is to protect the public under its police

250

Mohr, supra note 96, at 385.

251

Id.

252

Id.

253

Id. (citing Cal. Evid. Code § 911 (2000)).

254

Id. (citing General Dynamics v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487,

504 (1994)).
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power.255

However, since the Supreme Court shares this desire to

protect the public, transferring the duty to the Rules would not
minimize this concern.

Rather, making this proposed change

would ensure that the Supreme Court’s interests are also being
addressed.
Finally, this idea is neither radical nor novel.

The state

bars and supreme courts of every state other than California
oversee the duty of confidentiality.256

In joining the rest of

the country, California would not be relinquishing or watering
down its unique views on confidentiality;257 rather, the Bar
would be able to freely debate the issue without having to worry
about persuading the Legislature of its views.258

Moreover, it

is possible that the State Bar would support this transfer.

In

the wake of the Ossias case, COPRAC considered transferring the
section 6068(e) duty of confidentiality to a new rule but
abandoned the idea due to time constraints and other

255

Supra, Section IV(A)(1).

256

Thomas D. Morgan & Ronald D. Rotunda, 2004 Selected Standards

on Professional Responsibility, Appendix A, 144-155 (2004).
257

Bost, supra note 247.

258

See Huber, supra note 66 (discussing the Bar’s efforts to

lobby the Assembly).
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priorities.259

Now that the Court has denied COPRAC’s request to

change rule 3-600 and history has shown the political challenges
of modifying the statutory duty,260 the State Bar should propose
that the duty of confidentiality be transferred to the Rules of
Professional Conduct.
B.

Create a New Rule of Professional Conduct that Identifies
Whom the Government Attorney Is Representing and When to
Report Wrongdoing to This “Client”
1.

Proposal

This proposal calls on the California State Bar to
promulgate a new Rule of Professional Conduct that addresses the
attorney-client relationship in the government context.

As

noted, the language of Rule 3-600 does not apply to the unique
situation of government attorneys.261

Most importantly, the

State Bar should identify the government attorney’s client and
delineate an appropriate reporting scheme for informing that
“client” of wrongdoing in the organization.

Because changes to

the language of Rule 3-600 would be comprehensive, the State Bar

259

COPRAC Report, supra note 7, at 20-21.

In the wake of the

Quackenbush scandal, COPRAC considered transferring the duty of
confidentiality from section 6068(e) to a new rule 3-100.
260

Supra, Section IV(A)(2).

261

See supra, Section IV(C)(2).
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Id.

should adopt a new Rule that specifically addresses attorneyclient issues in the government.

This proposal should be

implemented regardless of whether the duty of confidentiality is
transferred to the Rules of Professional Conduct.262
a.

Identify Whom a Government Attorney Represents

Rule 3-600 identifies the nature of the relationship
between an attorney and her client.263

Where a client is an

organization, the Rule identifies to whom the attorney owes
allegiance.264

The State Bar and Supreme Court are the only

entities who should have the power to define the attorney-client
relationship.

The Court has the inherent power to regulate

attorney conduct.265

The Bar has expertise in understanding the

issues that affect attorneys and clients in conflict.266

The

fact that there is no equivalent statute in the Business and
Professions Code reflects the Court and Bar’s traditional roles
as the appropriate entities to define this relationship.

262

See id. at 21. “We never viewed a new rule 3-100 as necessary

to adopt our recommended changes to rule 3-600.”

Id.

263

See Cal. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3-600 (2007).

264

See id. R. 3-600(D).

265

See, e.g. In Re Discipline System, 967 P.2d 49, 55 (Cal.

1998).
266

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6013.5.
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This proposal differs significantly from COPRAC’s
unsuccessful attempt to modify Rule 3-600, in 2002.267

First,

COPRAC’s proposed Rule, although it purported to clarify “who
is” the government attorney’s client, did not specifically
identify the governmental client because COPRAC recognized that
an attorney’s client may vary from case to case.268

In other

words, COPRAC noted the complexity of deciding who the client is
but declined to answer the question.
Second, COPRAC’s suggestion in reality seemed to override
the statutory duty of confidentiality, or at least, call it into
question by creating a proposed safe-harbor provision.269

The

Proposed Rule contemplated a system for reporting within the
agency.270

If such a reporting scheme failed and certain

conditions were met, a government attorney

267

See supra, Section II(B).

268

COPRAC Report, Exh. 1 (Proposed Rule 3-600, Discussion, at 4).

“On the other hand, when a member represents a state agency, the
client generally will be the agency itself, but under certain
circumstances, it may also be a branch of government, such as
the executive branch, or the government as a whole.”
269

Id.

270

Id.
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Id.

would act consistently with his or her duty of protecting
any confidential information as provided in Business and
Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e) by referring
the matter to the law enforcement agency charged with
responsibility over the matter or to any other governmental
agency or official charged with overseeing or regulating
the matter.271
In other words, COPRAC tried provide a safe harbor to protect
government attorney whistleblowers from Bar prosecution.
Because COPRAC did not specify exactly whom a government
attorney represents, reporting to a “law enforcement agency” or
other agency with oversight” could arguably break one’s duty of
confidentiality.

Had COPRAC defined “client” as broadly as “the

government” or “the executive branch,” reporting to another
agency or law enforcement would not violate the duty.

COPRAC

itself recognized that the proposed rule might not be capable of
immunizing an attorney from violating the statutory duty of
confidentiality; “[a]lthough the Supreme Court can provide a
safe harbor from discipline for violation of the rules it has
adopted, there is a question whether it can provide a safe
harbor for a lawyer who violates a provision of the State Bar

271

Id.
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Act.”272

Consequently, the Supreme Court perceived that the

proposed rule unduly intervened with the Legislature’s
jurisdiction and denied the request.273
In contrast, the present proposal is limited to requesting
that the State Bar propose a rule that truly identifies the
government “client,” and the proper means of reporting
wrongdoing within the client entity.

Instead of trying to

provide a safe harbor, which could again be perceived as
interfering with the statute, the Bar should focus on defining
the attorney-client relationship to alert attorneys of the
limits of their representation of the government client.
To determine whom a government attorney represents, the
State Bar will need to evaluate the existing theories and
determine which best applies.

Designating which model the State

Bar should choose is beyond the scope of this article; however,
numerous scholars have contributed to the debate on the identity
of a government client.274

Given that there are so many

272

COPRAC Report, supra note 7, at 18.

273

In Re Adoption of Amendments to Rule 3-600 of the Rules of

Professional Conduct, No. S106482 (Cal. 2002) (on file with the
State Bar of California).
274

See, e.g. Roger C. Cramton, The Lawyer as Whistleblower:

Confidentiality and the Government Lawyer, 5 Geo. J. Legal
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permutations of the government attorney-client relationship
within the structure of the government,275 the Bar may have to
adopt a complex Rule with instructions for how to approach a
less-traditional representation model.
b.

Create a Separate Rule of Professional Conduct
That Incorporates This New Description of the
Attorney-Government Client Relationship.

Ethics 291, 296 (1991); Robert P. Lawry, Confidences and the
Government Lawyer, 57 N.C. L. Rev. 625 (1979); Solomon, supra
note 197, at 298-312; Witkowski, supra note 71, at 154-68.
275

See Witkowski, supra note 71, at 124-26.

Witkowski

identifies three examples where the question of “who is the
client” arises.

First, where an Assistant Attorney General is

tasked with litigating an issue for another government agency,
yet believes the case should be settled.

Second, where several

agencies within the same branch of government participate in
negotiations and the attorneys are working together despite
potentially adverse interests.

Third, where a city attorney is

assigned to represent the mayor charged with corruption and
feels that there is a conflict of interest because she is
“obligated to represent the interests of the government and the
public.”

Id.
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The State Bar should create a new Rule that would
specifically address the nuances of the attorney-client
relationship in the government context.276

First, because the

current rule fails to consider not only whom a government
attorney represents but also how to report wrongdoing to that
“client,”277 adopting a new Rule would be more less confusing
than separating each sub-section of Rule 3-600 into
“governmental organization” and “non-governmental organization.”
Moreover, if the State Bar decides to designate several models
for different government attorneys to identify their the client,
it might be simpler to just have a separate Rule.

However,

although this is the preferred method, if the Bar chooses not to
adopt a new Rule, it should at least change the language of Rule
3-600 as discussed above.
2. Addressing the Limitations of This Proposal
As noted above, identifying who exactly is the government
client will be a challenging task for the State Bar.

However,

leaving this inquiry unanswered would keep government attorneys
unsure of the nature of their relationship with their “client.”
Without clear guidance, an attorney who witnesses wrongdoing

276

This new Rule could be entitled “Governmental Organization as

Client.”
277

See supra, Section IV(C).
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would be placed in the uncomfortable position of trying to
figure out to whom she owes the duty of confidentiality.278

The

State Bar, with its many resources, should be able to answer
this question.

Finding the right approach to the issue of the

identity of a government client may even require several
attempts and extensive input from the community; however, this
is an essential task.

A government attorney who does not know

the identity of her client could be exposed to scrutiny from the
State Bar if she chooses to report wrongdoing.

Worse yet, she

might decide not to report it at all, to the detriment of the
citizens of California.
VI. Conclusion
Government attorneys in California are forced to choose
between their position as public servants and counselors of law.
Moving the duty of confidentiality to the Rules of Professional
Conduct would enable the Supreme Court to better manage this
important duty, and this in turn would ensure that the changing
needs of the legal system are being met.

The Supreme Court

could then consider the merits of creating an exception to duty
for government attorneys.

Regardless of whether this occurs,

the State Bar should adopt a new Rule of Professional Conduct
and, within it, define who, exactly, is the client of a

278

Doskow, Ethics Rules in Flux, supra note 102..
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government attorney.

Adopting one or both of these proposals

would provide clarity to attorneys who are currently forced to
choose between the legal system’s requirements and their own
ethical concerns.
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